Within a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. For price setting entails a continuum of price equilibria under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost pricing may be observed. As a consequence, Bertrand-Nash equilibrium pro…ts (welfare) may be higher (lower) than Cournot-Nash ones. The reversal of the standard rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive behaviour.
Introduction
A classical issue in modern industrial organization deals with ranking Nash equilibria generated by price or quantity competition. Absent externalities, the standard conclusion emerging from such comparison states the social superiority of Bertrand competition w.r.t. Cournot competition. This has been proved in a broad class of static games. 1 However, in a homogeneous product oligopoly, the comparison between the two types of equilibria has been long limited by the strict assumptions about technology needed to ensure the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium under Bertrand rules. Such a limitation has been bypassed by Dastidar (1995) , proving that, under concave demand and convex costs, price competition in a homogeneous oligopoly yields a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This result may then allow one to challenge the alleged greater e¢ ciency of Bertrand-Nash equilibria w.r.t. the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As long as Bertrand-Nash behaviour doesn't need to coincide with marginal cost pricing, the standard ranking between Bertrand-Nash and Cournot-Nash pro…ts and social welfare may be reversed. In this note, indeed, we show that, in the continuum of price equilibria under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost pricing may be observed. As a result, in a broad range of the parameter constellation, Bertrand-Nash equilibrium pro…ts (welfare) may be higher (lower)
than Cournot-Nash ones. It's worth noting that the reversal of the standard rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we set up the model and solve the two games. In section 3, we perform some comparative statics, instrumental to our main results illustrated in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1 See, fon instance, Singh and Vives (1984) , Vives (1985) , Okuguchi (1987) and Dastidar (1997) . With cost asymmetry and a small degree of product di¤erentiation, Zanchettin (2006) shows that the opposite can occur.
Setup and Nash equilibria
Consider a market supplied by a set N = 1; 2; 3; :::; n of identical …rms producing a homogeneous good whose demand function is p = 1 Q; where
q i is aggregate output and p is price. All …rms share the same technology, summarised by the convex cost function C i = cq 2 i =2. Accordingly, the pro…t function of …rm i is
where
Firms play simultaneously a non-cooperative one-shot game under complete, symmetric and imperfect information. The solution concept is the Nash equilibrium.
The quantity-setting game
If …rms are Cournot players, the relevant …rst order condition for …rm i is:
which, under the symmetry condition q j = q i = q for all i and j, yields the Cournot-Nash (CN ) equilibrium output
for each individual …rm. The resulting equilibrium pro…ts are
and social welfare is
where CS CN = nq CN 2 =2 is consumer surplus.
The price-setting game
Here, we follow Dastidar (1995) , where it is shown that, if costs are strictly convex in output levels, Bertrand competition yields a continuum of Nash The range of equilibrium prices is identi…ed by:
where BN mnemonics for Bertrand-Nash, and is a non-negative parameter whose range, to be speci…ed below, determines the continuum of equilibrium prices. The associated individual output and pro…ts are
The admissible range is 2 [0; 
Comparative statics
The very fact of the existence of a continuum of price equilibria ranging well above marginal cost pricing raises two related questions. The …rst deals with the monotonicity (or the lack thereof) of equilibrium pro…ts w.r.t. the number of …rms under Bertrand competition. The second issue is whether the pro…t ranking across the two regimes is robust to variations in industry structure as measured by the number of …rms, and/or the price mark-up determined by the value of . In this section we tackle the …rst question, while the second is postponed to the next section.
For completeness, we set out by summarising the e¤ect of an increase in n on Cournot-Nash equilibrium pro…ts. This is captured by the following derivative:
everywhere. This is the standard result we are well accustomed with, telling that individual pro…ts are monotonically decreasing in the number of quantitysetting …rms.
Now we examine the behaviour of Bertrand pro…ts w.r.t. n in our setting, where there exists a continuum of equilibria. We are going to prove the following:
Lemma 1 @ BN =@n > 0 for all n 2 n B ; n B + and negative elsewhere, with
Proof. The partial derivative of Bertrand-Nash pro…ts w.r.t. n is:
Since n > n 2 = (n + 1) ; which is the upper bound of the admissible interval for , the denominator of (11) Notice that, in order for the interval n B ; n B + to be economically meaningful, it must be that at least n B + 2; i.e., 
The existence of a range of industry structures wherein an increase in the number of …rms yields an increase in the Bertrand-Nash pro…ts suggests that
Bertand-Nash pro…ts might overcome those generated by those associated to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In the next section we show that this can indeed happen in an admissible portion of the parameter space.
Ranking equilibrium pro…ts and welfare
Under marginal cost pricing, it would be true that CN > BN for all n 2. However, since we follow Dastidar's (1995) approach to model Bertrand competition, we have to admit the possibility for BN to increase in n due to the presence of a mark-up exceeding its competitive level as increases above n=2:
To investigate whether this brings about a reversal of fortune across equilibria, it is appropriate to rede…ne the upper bound of in terms of a lower bound to n: This trivially requires solving the following inequality:
w.r.t. n, which delivers the equivalent condition
If one compares n against n B ; it turns out that
everywhere, because 3 p ( + 4) > 2 . Therefore, n > n B always.
The comparison between n and n B involves evaluating the sign of the following expression: 
which can be usefully rewritten as
where 48 
When > 1=2; @e c=@ < 0 and @ 2 e c=@ 2 > 0; as illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 The critical theshold of c.
Accordingly, we may identify three regions: R 1 f 2 [0; 1=2] ; c > 0g ; R 2 f > 1=2; c 2 (0; e c)g ; R 3 f > 1=2; c > e cg : By inspecting the ranking between n and n B + in these three regions, we draw the following:
In the space (c; n) ; Lemma 2 gives rise to Figures 2-3 , where n is a ‡at line because it is independent of c. In Figure 2 , 2 [0; 1=2] ; so that n > n
Since n must be at least as high as n; in this case @ BN =@n < 0 for all admissible n. Proof. The di¤erence between BN and CN can be written as
The denominator of the r.h.s. of (22) is always positive. The numerator is nil at
with c 2 > c 1 > c 3 for all 2 n 2 ; n 2 n + 1 and n 2.
Given that c (2 n) 2 (n ) > 0 for all c > c 1 and The di¤erence between welfare levels writes:
Solving SW CN SW BN = 0 w.r.t. c; one obtains the following roots: 
because the coe¢ cient of c 2 is negative above marginal cost pricing. 
